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Abstract
It is typically expected that if a mechanism is truthful, then the agents would, indeed,
truthfully report their private information. But why would an agent believe that the mechanism
is truthful? We wish to design truthful mechanisms, whose truthfulness can be verified efficiently
(in the computational sense). Our approach involves three steps: (i) specifying the structure
of mechanisms, (ii) constructing a verification algorithm, and (iii) measuring the quality of
verifiably truthful mechanisms. We demonstrate this approach using a case study: approximate
mechanism design without money for facility location.
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1 Introduction
The mechanism design literature includes a vast collection of clever schemes that, in most cases,
provably give rise to a specified set of properties. Arguably, the most sought-after property is
truthfulness, more formally known as incentive compatibility or strategyproofness: an agent must
not be able to benefit from dishonestly revealing its private information. Truthfulness is, in a
sense, a prerequisite for achieving other theoretical guarantees, because without it the mechanism
may receive unpredictable input information that has little to do with reality. For example, if the
designer’s goal is to maximize utilitarian social welfare (the sum of agents’ utilities for the outcome),
but the mechanism is not truthful, the mechanism would indeed maximize social welfare — albeit,
presumably, with respect to the wrong utility functions!
An implicit assumption underlying the preceding (rather standard) reasoning is that when a
truthful mechanism is used, (rational) agents would participate truthfully. This requires the agents
to believe that the mechanism is actually truthful. Why would this be the case? Well, in principle
the agents can look up the proof of truthfulness.1 A more viable option is to directly verify
truthfulness by examining the specification of the mechanism itself, but, from a computational
complexity viewpoint, this problem would typically be extremely hard — even undecidable. This
observation is related to the more general principle that the mechanism should be transparent or
simple, so that bounded rational economic agents can reason about it and take decisions efficiently.
Motivated by the preceding arguments, our goal in this paper is to design mechanisms that are
verifiably truthful. Specifically, we would like the verification to be efficient — in the computational
sense (i.e., polynomial time), not the economic sense. In other words, the mechanism must be
truthful, and, moreover, each agent must be able to efficiently verify this fact.
1.1 Our Approach and Results
Our approach to the design of verifiably truthful mechanisms involves three steps:
I Specifying the structure of mechanisms: The verification algorithm will receive a mechanism
as input — so we must rigorously specify which mechanisms are admissible as input, and
what they look like.
II Constructing a verification algorithm: Given a mechanism in the specified format, the algo-
rithm decides whether the mechanism is truthful.
III Measuring the quality of verifiably truthful mechanisms: The whole endeavor is worthwhile
(if and) only if the family of mechanisms whose truthfulness can be verified efficiently (via
the algorithm of Step 2) is rich enough to provide high-quality outcomes.
We instantiate this program in the context of a case study: approximate mechanism design
without money for facility location [27]. The reason for choosing this specific domain is twofold.
First, a slew of recent papers has brought about a good understanding of what quality guarantees
are achievable via truthful facility location mechanisms [1, 21, 20, 25, 13, 14, 15, 29, 30, 8, 32].
Second, facility location has also served as a proof of concept for the approximate mechanism
design without money agenda [27], whose principles were subsequently applied to a variety of other
1A related, interesting question is: If we told human players that a non-truthful mechanism is provably truthful,
would they play truthfully?
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domains, including allocation problems [17, 16, 12, 9], approval voting [2], kidney exchange [3, 7],
and scheduling [19]. Similarly, facility location serves as an effective proof of concept for the idea
of verifiably truthful mechanisms, which, we believe, is widely applicable.
We present our results according to the three steps listed above:
I In §2, we put forward a representation of facility location mechanisms. In general, these
are arbitrary functions mapping the reported locations of n agents on the real line to the
facility location (also on the real line). We present deterministic mechanisms as decision
trees, which branch on comparison queries in internal nodes, and return a function that is a
convex combination of the reported locations in the leaves. Roughly speaking, randomized
mechanisms are distributions over deterministic mechanisms, but we use a slightly more
expressive model to enable a concise representation for certain randomized mechanisms that
would otherwise need a huge representation.
II The cost of an agent is the distance between its (actual) location, which is its private in-
formation, and the facility location. A deterministic mechanism is truthful if an agent can
never decrease its cost by reporting a false location. In §3, we show that the truthfulness
of a deterministic mechanism can be verified in polynomial time in the size of its decision
tree representation and number of agents. We also demonstrate that one cannot do much
better: it is necessary to at least inspect all the tree’s leaves. We establish that the efficient
verification result extends to randomized mechanisms, as long as the notion of truthfulness
is universal truthfulness: it must be impossible to gain from manipulating one’s reported
location, regardless of the mechanism’s coin tosses.
III Building on the results of Step II, we focus on decision trees of polynomial size — if such
mechanisms are truthful, their truthfulness can be efficiently verified. In §4, we study the
quality of polynomial-size decision trees, via two measures of quality: the social cost (the
sum of agents’ cost functions) and the maximum cost (of any agent). Figure 1 summarizes
our results. The table on the left shows tight bounds on the (multiplicative, worst-case)
approximation ratio that can be achieved by truthful mechanisms [27] — deterministic in the
first row, randomized in the second. The (lower) bound for the maximum cost of universally
truthful mechanisms is new. The results for efficiently verifiable mechanisms are shown in
the right table. Our main results pertain to the social cost (left column): while deterministic
polynomial-size decision trees only achieve an approximation ratio of Θ(n/ log n), we construct
(for any constant ǫ > 0) a polynomial-size, randomized, universally truthful decision tree
approximating the social cost to a factor of 1 + ǫ.
1.2 Related Work
Verification is a common theme in algorithmic mechanism design, but in the past it was always
the agents’ reports that were being verified, not the properties of the mechanism itself. In fact,
in the eponymous paper by Nisan and Ronen [24], a class of mechanisms with verification (and
money) for scheduling was proposed. These mechanisms are allowed to observe both the reported
types and the actual types (based on the execution of jobs), and payments may depend on both.
Verification of agents’ reports has subsequently played a role in a number of papers; of special
note is the work of Caragiannis et al. [6], who focused on different notions of verification. They
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General
Mechanisms
Social Cost Max Cost
Truthful 1 2
Univ. Truthful 1 2 (∗)
Polynomial-size
Decision Trees
Social Cost Max Cost
Truthful Θ
(
n
logn
)
2
Univ. Truthful 1 + ǫ 2
Figure 1: The results of §4, outlined in §1.1. The lower bound (∗) for general mechanisms is also
shown in this paper.
distinguished between partial verification, which restricts agents to reporting a subset of types that
is a function of their true type (e.g., in scheduling agents can only report that they are slower than
they actually are, not faster), and probabilistic verification, which catches an agent red handed with
probability that depends on its true type and reported type. There are also examples of this flavor
of verification in approximate mechanism design without money [19].
A small body of work in multiagent systems [26, 5, 28] actually aims to verify properties of
mechanisms and games. The work of Tadjouddine et al. [28] is perhaps closest to ours, as they
verify the truthfulness of auction mechanisms. Focusing on the Vickrey Auction [31], they specify it
using the Promela process modeling language, and then verify its truthfulness via model checking
techniques. This basically amounts to checking all possible bid vectors and deviations in a dis-
cretized bid space. To improve the prohibitive running time, abstract model checking techniques
are applied. While model checking approaches are quite natural, they inevitably rely on heuristic
solutions to problems that are generally very hard. In contrast, we are interested in mechanisms
whose truthfulness can be verified in polynomial time.
Mu’alem [23] considers a motivating scenario similar to ours and focuses on testing extended
monotonicity, which is a property required for truthfulness in the single parameter domain studied
therein. In particular, Mu’alem shows that if a function f is ǫ-close to extended monotonicity, then
there exists an associated payment function p such that the mechanism given by the tuple (f, p) is
(1− 2ǫ)-truthful. She also describes a shifting technique for obtaining almost truthful mechanisms
and a monotonicity tester. While studying truthfulness in the context of property testing remains
an interesting question for future work, we would like to obtain mechanisms whose truthfulness can
be verified exactly and in polynomial time (independent of the size of the domain — in fact, our
domain is continuous). On a technical level, we study a setting without payments, so our setting
does not admit a close connection between monotonicity and truthfulness.
Kang and Parkes [18] consider the scenario in which multiple entities (e.g. companies, people,
network services) can deploy mechanisms in an open computational infrastructure. Like us, they
are interested in verifying the truthfulness of mechanisms, but they sidestep the question of how
mechanisms are represented by focusing on what they call passive verification: their verifier acts as
an intermediary and monitors the sequence of inputs and outputs of the mechanism. The verifier is
required to be sound and complete; in particular, if the mechanism is not strategyproof, the verifier
is guaranteed to establish this fact after observing all the possible inputs and outputs.
Our work is also related to the line of work on automated mechanism design [10], which seeks
to automatically design truthful mechanisms that maximize an objective function, given a prior
distribution over agents’ types. In an informal sense, this problem is much more difficult than our
verification problem, and, indeed, in general it is computationally hard even when the mechanism
is explicitly represented as a function whose domain is all possible type vectors. Automated mech-
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anism design is tractable in special cases — such as when the number of agents is constant and
the mechanism is randomized — but these results do not yield nontrivial insights on the design of
verifiably truthful mechanisms.
2 Step I: Specifying the Structure of Mechanisms
We consider the (game-theoretic) facility location problem [27]. An instance includes a set N =
{1, . . . , n} of agents. Each agent i ∈ N has a location xi. The vector x = 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 represents the
location profile. We relegate the presentation of the strategic aspects of this setting to Section 3.
2.1 Deterministic Mechanisms
A deterministic mechanism (for n agents) is a function M : Rn → R, which maps each location
profile x to a facility location y ∈ R. We put forward a simple, yet expressive, representation of
deterministic mechanisms, via decision trees.
In more detail, given input x = 〈x1, . . . , xn〉, the mechanism is represented as a tree, with:
• Internal nodes: used to verify sets of constraints over the input variables. We focus on a
comparison-based model of computation, in which each internal node verifies one constraint,
of the form (xi ≥ xj), (xi ≤ xj), (xi > xj), or (xi < xj), for some i, j ∈ N . The node has two
outgoing edges, that are taken depending on whether the condition is true or false.
• Leaves: store the outcome of the mechanism if the path to that leaf is taken, i.e. the facility
location.We require that for each leaf L, the location of the facility at L, yL(x), is a convex
combination of the input locations: yL(x) =
∑n
i=1 λL,i · xi, where the λL,i are constants with
λL,i ≥ 0 and
∑n
i=1 λL,i = 1.
For example, Figure 2 shows the decision tree representation of the average mechanism, which
returns the average of the reported locations. It is just a single leaf, with coefficients λi = 1/n for
all i ∈ N . Figure 3 shows a dictatorship of agent i — whatever location is reported by agent i is
always selected. Figure 4 shows the median mechanism for n = 3, which returns the median of the
three reported locations; this mechanism will play a key role later on.
We remark that our positive results are based on mechanisms that have the so-called peaks-only
property: they always select one of the reported locations. However, our more expressive definition
of the leaves of the decision tree (as convex combinations of points in x) is needed to compute
optimal solutions under one of our two objectives (as we discuss below), and also strengthens our
negative results.
2.2 Randomized Mechanisms
Intuitively, randomized mechanisms are allowed to make branching decisions based on coin tosses.
Without loss of generality, we can just toss all possible coins in advance, so a randomized mechanism
x1+x2+...xn
n
Figure 2: The average mechanism.
xi
Figure 3: Dictatorship of agent i.
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x1 ≥ x2
x2 ≥ x3
x2
yes
x1 ≥ x2
x3
yes
x1
no
no
yes
x2 ≥ x3
x1 ≥ x3
x3
no
x1
no
yes
x2
no
no
Figure 4: The median mechanism for 3 agents.
can be represented as a probability distribution over deterministic decision trees. However, this
can lead to a large representation of simple mechanisms that consist of the same (fixed) subroutine
executed with possibly different input variables. For example, the mechanism that selects a (not
very small) subset of agents uniformly at random and computes the median of the subset can be
seen as a median mechanism parameterized by the identities of the agents. In order to be able to
represent such mechanisms concisely, we make the representation a bit more expressive.
Formally, a randomized mechanism is represented by a decision tree with a chance node of degree
K as the root, such that the r’th edge selects a decision tree Tr and is taken with probability pr,
where
∑K
i=1 pi = 1. Each tree Tr is defined as follows:
• There is a set of agents Nr ⊆ N , such that the locations xi for i ∈ N appear directly in the
internal nodes and leaves of the tree.
• There is a set of parameters Zr = {zr,1, . . . , zr,mr}, that also appear in the internal nodes and
leaves of Tr, where 0 ≤ mr ≤ |N \Nr|.
• The description of Tr includes a probability distribution over tuples of mr distinct agents
from N \Nr.
The semantics are as follows. At the beginning of the execution, a die is tossed to determine
the index r ∈ {1, . . . ,K} of the function (i.e. tree Tr) to be implemented. Then, the parameters
zr,j are bound to locations of agents from N \Nr according to the given probability distribution for
Tr; each zr,j is bound to a different agent. At this point all the parameters in the nodes and leaves
of Tr have been replaced by variables xi, and we just have a deterministic decision tree, which is
executed as described above.
For example, say we want to implement the mechanism that selects three agents uniformly
at random from N and outputs the median of these three agents. This mechanism requires a
randomized decision tree with a chance node of degree one, that selects with probability p1 = 1
a single decision tree T1, which is the tree in Figure 4 with the xi variables replaced by zi. We
set N1 = ∅ (thus the tree T1 is completely parameterized), and the probability distribution over
distinct subsets of size 3 from N \N1 = N is just the uniform distribution over such subsets.
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3 Step II: Constructing a Verification Algorithm
In Section 2 we focused on the non-strategic aspects of the facility location game: agents report
their locations, which are mapped by a mechanism to a facility location. The potential for strategic
behavior stems from the assumption that the agents’ locations x are private information — xi
represents agent i’s ideal location for the facility (also known as agent i’s peak). Like Procaccia
and Tennenholtz [27], and almost all subsequent papers, we assume that the cost of agent i for
facility location y is simply the Euclidean distance between (the true) xi and y,
cost(xi, y) = |xi − y|.
3.1 Deterministic Mechanisms
A deterministic mechanism M : Rn → R is truthful if for every location profile x ∈ Rn, ev-
ery agent k ∈ N , and every x′k ∈ R, cost(xk,M(x)) ≤ cost(xk,M(x
′
k,x−k), where x−k =
〈x1, . . . , xk−1, xk+1, . . . , xn〉. Our next goal is to construct an algorithm that receives as input
a deterministic mechanism, represented as a decision tree, and verifies that it is truthful.
The verification algorithm is quite intuitive, although its formal specification is somewhat elab-
orate. Consider a mechanismM : Rn → R that is represented by a tree T . For a leaf L, denote the
location chosen by M at this leaf by yL(x) =
∑n
i=1 λL,i · xi. In addition, let C(L) denote the set
of constraints encountered on the path to L. For example, the set of constraints corresponding to
the leftmost leaf in Figure 4 is {(x1 ≥ x2), (x2 ≥ x3)}, while the second leaf from the left verifies:
{(x1 ≥ x2), (x2 < x3), (x1 ≥ x3)}. We define a procedure, Build-Leaf-Constraints, that gath-
ers these constraints (Algorithm 3). One subtlety is that the procedure “inflates” strict inequality
constraints to constraints that require a difference of at least 1; we will explain shortly why this is
without loss of generality.
The main procedure, Truthful (given as Algorithm 1), checks whether there exist location
profiles x and x′ that differ only in the k’th coordinate, such that x reaches leaf L (based on the
constraints of the Build-Leaf-Constraints procedure, given as Algorithm 3 in Section A of the
appendix), x′ reaches leaf L′, and cost(xk, yL′(x
′)) + 1 ≤ cost(xk, yL(x)), i.e. the reduction in cost
is at least 1.
So why can we “inflate” strict inequalities by requiring a difference of 1? Assume that we are
given a mechanism T and an agent i such that for some strategy profiles x and x′ with x−i = x
′
−i,
agent i can strictly benefit by switching from x to x′. Then there exists ǫ > 0 such that agent
i’s improvement is at least ǫ, and for every strict inequality satisfied by x and x′, the difference
between the terms is at least ǫ; for example, if xk > xl, then it is the case that xk − xl ≥ ǫ. Since
each facility location is a homogeneous linear function of the input x, all variables can be multiplied
by 1ǫ to obtain that x/ǫ and x
′/ǫ satisfy the more stringent constraints (with a difference of 1) on
agent locations and facility locations.
Finally, this algorithm works in polynomial time because the procedure Exists-Solution,
which checks whether there is a solution to the different constraints (corresponding to a profitable
manipulation), just solves a linear program using the procedure Solve.
We summarize the preceding discussion with the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Let N = {1, . . . , n}. The truthfulness of a deterministic mechanism M represented
as a decision tree T can be verified in polynomial time in n and |T |.
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Algorithm 1: Truthful(T ) // Verifier for Deterministic Mechanisms
Data: mechanism T
Result: true if T represents a truthful mechanism, false otherwise
1 Build-Leaf-Constraints(T )
2 foreach k ∈ N do
3 foreach leaf L ∈ T do
4 // yL(x) is the symbolic expression for the facility at L on x
5 // dk(x) is agent k’s distance from the facility on input x
6 foreach dk(x) ∈ {xk − yL(x),−xk + yL(x)} do
7 // two cases, for xk to the left or right of the facility yL(x)
8 foreach leaf L′ ∈ T do
9 foreach d′k(x
′) ∈ {x′k − yL′(x
′),−x′k + yL′(x
′)} do
10 inc(x,x′)← {(dk(x) − d
′
k(x
′) ≥ 1), dk(x) ≥ 0, d
′
k(x
′) ≥ 0}
11 // utility increase from x to x′, distances are non-negative
12 if Exists-Solution(k, CL, CL′ , inc) then
13 return False
14 return True
Algorithm 2: Exists-Solution(k, CL, C
′
L′ , inc)
Data: agent k and symbolic constraint sets CL, C
′
L′ , inc
Result: true ⇐⇒ ∃ x1, . . . , xn, x
′
k ∈ R
+ subject to CL(x) & C
′
L(x
′
k,x−k) & inc(x, (x
′
k,x−k))
1 x′ ← (x1, . . . , xi−1, x
′
i, xi+1, . . . , xn)
2 W ← {CL(x), C
′
L(x
′), inc(x,x′)}
3 z← (x1, . . . , xn, x
′
i)
4 return Solve(z,W, z ≥ 0) // Linear program solver
Algorithm 1 essentially carries out a brute force search over pairs of leaves to find a profitable
manipulation. Under the decision tree representation, is it possible to verify truthfulness much
more efficiently? Our next result answers this question in the negative. The proof is included in
the appendix, together with all the other proofs omitted from the main text.
Theorem 2. Let N = {1, . . . , n} with n ≥ 2, and ℓ ≤ n!. Then any algorithm that verifies
truthfulness for every deterministic decision tree with ℓ leaves for n agents must inspect all the
leaves in the worst case.
Crucially, our decision trees are binary trees, so the number of leaves is exactly the number of
internal nodes plus one. Theorem 2 therefore implies:
Corollary 1. Let N = {1, . . . , n}, n ≥ 2. Any verification algorithm requires superpolynomial time
in n (in the worst-case) to verify the truthfulness of trees of superpolynomial size in n.
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3.2 Randomized Mechanisms
In the context of randomized mechanisms, there are two common options for defining truthfulness:
truthfulness in expectation and universal truthfulness. In our context, truthfulness in expectation
means that an agent cannot decrease its expected distance to the facility by deviating; univer-
sal truthfulness means that the randomized mechanism is a probability distribution over truthful
deterministic mechanisms, i.e., an agent cannot benefit from manipulation regardless of the mech-
anism’s random coin tosses. Clearly, the former notion of truthfulness is weaker than the latter.
In some settings, truthful-in-expectation mechanisms are known to achieve guarantees that cannot
be obtained through universally truthful mechanisms [11].
We focus on universal truthfulness, in part because we do not know whether truthful-in-
expectation mechanisms can be efficiently verified (as we discuss in §5). Using Theorem 1, universal
truthfulness is easy to verify, because it is sufficient and necessary to verify the truthfulness of each
of the decision trees in the mechanism’s support. One subtlety is the binding of agents in N \Nr
to the zr,j parameters. However, for the purpose of verifying truthfulness, any binding will do by
symmetry between the agents in N \Nr. We therefore have the following result:
Theorem 3. Let N = {1, . . . , n}. The universal truthfulness of a randomized mechanism M
represented as a distribution over K decision trees T1, . . . ,TK can be verified in polynomial time in
n and its representation size,
∑K
r=1 |Tr|.
4 Step III: Measuring the Quality of Verifiably Truthful Mecha-
nisms
We have shown that the truthfulness of mechanisms represented by decision trees of polynomial
size can be verified in polynomial time. This result is encouraging, but it is only truly meaningful
if decision trees of polynomial size can describe mechanisms that provide good guarantees with
respect to the quality of the solution.
Like Procaccia and Tennenholtz [27], and subsequent papers, we measure solution quality in
the facility location domain via two measures. The social cost of a facility location y ∈ R for a
location profile x ∈ Rn is
sc(x, y) =
n∑
i=1
cost(xi, y),
and the maximum cost is
mc(x, y) = max
i∈N
cost(xi, y).
We denote the optimal solutions with respect to the social cost and maximum cost by sc∗(x) =
miny∈R
∑n
i=1 cost(xi, y), and mc
∗(x) = miny∈Rmaxi∈N cost(xi, y), respectively.
4.1 Deterministic Mechanisms
Let us first review what can be done with deterministic mechanisms represented by decision trees
of arbitrary size, without necessarily worrying about verification.
For the maximum cost, the optimal solution is clearly the midpoint between the leftmost and
rightmost reported locations. It is interesting to note that the midpoint may not be one of the
agents’ reported locations — so, to compute the optimal solution, our expressive representation of
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the leaves as convex combinations of points in x is required. Procaccia and Tennenholtz [27] have
shown that any truthful mechanism cannot achieve an approximation ratio smaller than 2 for the
maximum cost. A ratio of 2 is achieved by any solution that places the facility between the leftmost
and rightmost reported locations. It follows that the optimal ratio is trivial to obtain truthfully,
e.g., by always selecting the location x1 reported by agent 1. This mechanism is representable via
a tiny decision tree with one leaf.
We conclude that, in the context of deterministic mechanisms and the maximum cost objective,
truthful mechanisms that are efficiently verifiable can do just as well as any truthful mechanism.
Let us therefore focus on the social cost. For any number of agents n, it is easy to see that
selecting the median of the reported locations is the optimal solution. Indeed, if the facility moves
right or left, the facility would get further away from a majority of locations, and closer to a minority
of locations. The median mechanism was observed by Moulin [22] to be truthful. Intuitively, this
is because the only way an agent can manipulate the median’s location is by reporting a location
that is on the other side of the median — but that only pushes the median away from the agent’s
actual location. Moreover, the median can be computed by a decision tree in which every internal
node contains comparisons between the input locations, and each leaf L outputs the location of the
facility (the median) when L is reached.
In contrast to the maximum cost, though, the optimal mechanism for the social cost — the
median — requires a huge decision tree representation. The number of comparisons required to
compute the median has been formally studied (see, e.g., Blum et al. [4]), but, in our case, simple
intuition suffices: if there is an odd number of agents with distinct locations, the median cannot be
determined when nothing is known about the location of one of the agents, so (n−1)/2 comparisons
are required in the best case, leading to a tall binary tree of exponential size.
Our next result strengthens this insight by giving a lower bound on the approximation ratio
achievable by polynomial size decision trees (i.e., trees efficiently verifiable by our algorithm of §3).
Theorem 4. For every constant k ∈ N, every truthful deterministic decision tree for n agents of
size at most nk has an approximation ratio of Ω
(
n
logn
)
for the social cost.
On the positive side, we show that the lower bound of Theorem 4 is asymptotically tight.
Theorem 5. For every n ∈ N there is a truthful deterministic decision tree of size O(n6) that
approximates the social cost within a factor of O
(
n
log(n)
)
.
In summary, polynomial-size decision trees can achieve the best possible approximation ratio
(among all truthful deterministic mechanisms) with respect to the maximum cost objective and an
approximation ratio of Θ(n/ log n) with respect to the social cost.
4.2 Randomized Mechanisms
We next turn to randomized mechanisms. In this context, we are interested in the expected social
cost, or the expected maximum cost. The latter measure is somewhat subtle, so let us state
specifically that, like Procaccia and Tennenholtz [27], we are interested in
E
[
mc(x,M(x))
]
= E
[
max
i∈N
cost(xi,M(x))
]
.
A less stringent alternative would be to take the maximum over agents of the agent’s expected cost.
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It is immediately apparent that universally truthful, randomized, small decision trees can easily
beat the lower bound of Theorem 4 for social cost. To see this, consider the random dictator
mechanism, that selects an agent i ∈ N uniformly at random, and returns the location xi. This
mechanism is clearly universally truthful (it is a uniform distribution over dictatorships), and it is
easy to verify that its approximation ratio is 2− 2/n.
Our next theorem, which we view as the main result of this section, shows that randomization
allows us to get arbitrarily close to 1 using universally truthful, efficiently-verifiable mechanisms.
Theorem 6. For every 0 < ǫ < 110 and n ∈ N, there exists a universally truthful randomized
decision tree of polynomial size in n that approximates the social cost to a factor of 1 + ǫ.
In stark contrast, universal truthfulness does not help obtain a better bound than the trivial
approximation ratio of 2 for the maximum cost — even in the case of general mechanisms.
Theorem 7. For each ǫ > 0, there exists no universally truthful mechanism given by a distribution
over countably many deterministic mechanisms that can approximate the maximum cost within a
factor of 2− ǫ.
We have the following corollary for universally truthful decision trees.
Corollary 2. For each ǫ > 0, there exists no universally truthful decision tree mechanism given by
a distribution over countably many deterministic decision trees that can approximate the maximum
cost within a factor of 2− ǫ.
5 Discussion
Theorem 7 shows that universally truthful decision trees cannot achieve a nontrivial (better than
2) approximation for the maximum cost. In contrast, Procaccia and Tennenholtz [27] designed a
truthful-in-expectation mechanism that approximates the maximum cost to a factor of 3/2. This
motivates the study of truthful-in-expectation randomized decision trees, as an alternative to uni-
versal truthfulness. However, we do not know whether truthfulness in expectation can be efficiently
verified (and we believe that it cannot). Intuitively, the main difficulty is that, for every selection of
one leaf from each tree in the support of the randomized mechanism, a na¨ıve verification algorithm
would need to reason about whether a certain location profile x can reach this collection of leaves
under the constraints imposed by the different trees.
Our work focuses on the case of locating one facility on the line, which is quite simple from
the approximate-mechanism-design-without-money viewpoint. Researchers have investigated ap-
proximate mechanism design in generalized facility location settings, involving multiple facili-
ties [27, 21, 20, 25, 13, 14, 15], different cost functions [32, 15], metric spaces and graphs [1, 20],
and so on. Of these generalizations and extensions, all but one only require a rethinking of our
results of §4 — that is, mechanisms can still be represented as polynomial-size decision trees. But
moving from the real line to a more general metric space requires a revision of the way mechanisms
are represented in our framework.
We conclude by re-emphasizing the main message of our paper. In our view, our main contri-
bution is the three-step approach to the design of verifiably truthful mechanisms. Our technical
results provide a proof of concept by instantiating this approach in the context of a well-studied
facility location setting, and constructing verifiably truthful mechanisms that achieve good quality
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guarantees. We firmly believe, though, that the same approach is widely applicable. For exam-
ple, is there a class of mechanisms for combinatorial auctions that gives rise to verifiably truthful
mechanisms providing a good approximation to social welfare? One can ask similar questions in
the context of every problem studied in algorithmic mechanism design (with or without money).
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A Step II: Constructing a Verification Algorithm
Below we give the pseudocode for Build-Leaf-Constraints (Algorithm 3), which is used in the
main verification algorithm.
Algorithm 3: Build-Leaf-Constraints(T )
Data: mechanism T
Result: set of symbolic constraints C; the location at leaf L is selected on input x ⇐⇒
constraints CL(x) hold
1 C ← ∅ // Initialize the set of constraints
2 foreach leaf L ∈ T do
3 Q← L
4 while Q 6= Null do
5 // Add the constraint that must hold for Q to be reached from parent(Q)
6 c← constraint (parent (Q).Next() = Q)
7 switch c do
8 case xic ≥ xjc
9 CL(x)← CL(x) ∪ {xic − xjc ≥ 0}
10 case xic > xjc
11 CL(x)← CL(x) ∪ {xic − xjc ≥ 1}
12 case xic ≤ xjc
13 CL(x)← CL(x) ∪ {xjc − xic ≥ 0}
14 case xic < xjc
15 CL(x)← CL(x) ∪ {xjc − xic ≥ 1}
16 Q← parent (Q)
17 return C
Theorem 2 (restated): Let N = {1, . . . , n} with n ≥ 2, and ℓ ≤ n!. Then any algorithm that
verifies truthfulness for every deterministic decision tree with ℓ leaves for n agents must inspect all
the leaves in the worst case.
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Proof. Assume by contradiction there exists a verification algorithm that can check truthfulness
for every tree with ℓ leaves without inspecting all the leaves. Let T be a decision tree in which
every internal node has the form xi < xj , for i, j ∈ N such that i < j, and the location is set to
x1 in every leaf. Since there are n! possible orders of the agent locations, we can generate such a
tree with ℓ leaves. Clearly, T is truthful since it coincides with the mechanism in which agent 1 is
a dictator.
Consider the execution of the verification algorithm on input T and let L be a leaf that is not
inspected by the algorithm. Construct a tree T ′ that is identical to T , with the exception of leaf
L, where the selected location is yL(x) =
x1+...xn
n . First note that mechanism T
′ is not truthful.
For every leaf of T ′, the mechanism cannot enforce that two variables are equal, since that would
require comparing xi < xj and xj < xi (similarly if weak inequalities are used). However, if i < j
then T ′ can only check if xi < xj ; similarly, if j < i, then T
′ can only check if xj < xi. Thus the
leaf L can be reached when the input x is consistent with some strict ordering π on n elements.
Define x ∈ Rn such that xπ1 < xπ2 < . . . < xπn . Then yL(x) =
x1+...xn
n and the cost of agent
πn is cost(xπn , yL(x)) = xπn − yL(x). There exists δ > 0 such that by reporting x
′
πn = xπn + δ,
agent πn ensures that leaf L is still reached and the new cost is lower:
cost(xπn , yL(x
′
πn ,x−πn)) = xπn −
(∑
i 6=πn
xi
)
+ (xπn + δ)
n
< xπn −
x1 + . . .+ xn
n
= cost(xπn , yL(x)).
However, since the verification algorithm does not inspect leaf L, it cannot distinguish between T
and T ′, and so it decides that T ′ is also truthful. This contradicts the correctness of the verification
algorithm.
B Step III: Measuring the Quality of Verifiably Truthful Mecha-
nisms
B.1 Mising Proofs: Deterministic Mechanisms
Theorem 4 (restated): Let N = {1, . . . , n} with n ≥ 2, and ℓ ≤ n!. For every constant k ∈ N,
every truthful deterministic decision tree for n agents of size at most nk has an approximation ratio
of Ω
(
n
logn
)
for the social cost.
Proof. Let M be a deterministic mechanism represented by some decision tree T of size at most
nk. Recall that every internal node in T checks the order of two input variables with one of the
following inequalities: {xi ≥ xj, xi ≤ xj , xi < xj, xi > xj}.
Since T is binary and |T | ≤ nk, there exists at least one leaf L ∈ T of depth
d < 2 · log(|T |) ≤ 2 log(nk) = 2k log(n).
Let SL = {i1, . . . , im} be the set of agents whose locations are inspected on the path to L. It holds
that |SL| = m ≤ 2 · d ≤ 4k · log(n), since L has depth d and each node on the path to L inspects
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two locations. Note that if SL = ∅, then M is a dictatorship, and so its approximation ratio is no
better than n− 1. Thus we can assume that SL 6= ∅.
Recall that the facility at L is a convex combination of the input locations; that is, yL(x) =∑n
i=1 λL,i · xi, where λL,i ∈ [0, 1],∀i ∈ N and
∑n
i=1 λL,i = 1. Let π be a weak ordering consistent
with the leaf L and DL = {i1, . . . , il} a “deduplicated” version of SL, such that DL contains one
representative agent i for each maximal subset W ⊆ SL with the property that under π, xj = xi,
∀j ∈W . Note that DL is consistent with some strict ordering σ on l elements.
We distinguish between three cases:
1. The facility at L is a convex combination of agents in SL only (i.e., λL,i = 0, ∀i 6∈ SL).
Let ǫ be fixed such that 0 < ǫ < |SL|n and define the following input x = 〈x1, . . . , xn〉:
• For each i ∈ DL, let ri be the number of agents in DL strictly to the left of i according
to σ; set xi ← ǫ ·
(
ri
n
)
.
• For each j ∈ SL \DL, set xj ← xi, where i ∈ DL and xi = xj according to π.
• For each j 6∈ SL, set xj ← 1.
The optimal location of the facility given x is y∗ = 1, since most agents are situated at 1
(except the agents in SL, of which there are at most: 4k log(n) ≪ n/2). The optimal social
cost is:
sc∗(x) =
n∑
i=1
cost(xi, y
∗) =
∑
i∈SL
(1− xi) ≤ 1 · |SL|.
On the other hand, the output of the mechanism is yL(x) =
∑
i∈SL
λL,i · xi ≤ ǫ; the social
cost incurred by M on x is:
sc(x,M(x)) =
n∑
i=1
cost(xi, yL(x)) ≥ (n − |SL|) · (1− ǫ).
Choosing ǫ ≤ 1/n, the approximation ratio of M is no better than:
sc(x,M(x))
sc∗(x)
≥
(n− |SL|) · (1− ǫ)
|SL|
=
n
|SL|
−
nǫ
|SL|
− 1 + ǫ
>
n
4k log(n)
− 2 ∈ Ω
(
n
log(n)
)
.
2. The facility coincides with the location of some agent t 6∈ SL (i.e. yL(x) = xt).
Similarly to Case 1, let ǫ be fixed such that 0 < ǫ < |SL|+1n and define x = 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 as
follows:
• For each i ∈ DL, let ri be the number of agents in DL strictly to the left of i according
to σ; set xi ← ǫ ·
(
ri
n
)
.
• For each j ∈ SL \DL, set xj ← xi, where i ∈ DL and xi = xj according to π.
15
• Set xt = 0.
• For each j 6∈ SL, j 6= t, set xj ← 1.
The optimal location on x is y∗ = 1, since most agents are located at 1 (except agent t and
the agents in SL). As in Case 1, by also taking agent t into account, we get:
sc(x,M(x))
sc∗(x)
≥
(n− |SL| − 1) · (1− ǫ)
|SL|+ 1
∈ Ω
(
n
log(n)
)
.
3. The facility is a weighted sum with at least two terms, one of which is an agent t 6∈ SL. We
claim that no mechanism that is truthful on the full domain (i.e. the line) can have such an
output at any leaf. Let ǫ, δ > 0 be such that
δ =
1
2
(
1
λL,t
− 1
)
and ǫ =
1− λL,t(1 + δ)
n− 1
.
Consider an input x consistent with the ordering π such that xt = 1 and xi ∈ (0, ǫ),∀i 6= t.
Then:
yL(x) =
n∑
i=1
λL,i · xi =

∑
i 6=t
λL,i · xi

+ λL,t · 1.
If agent t reports instead x′t = 1 + δ, the output of M on x
′ = (x′t,x−t) is:
yL(x
′) =

∑
i 6=t
λL,i · xi

+ λL,t · (1 + δ).
It can be verified that 0 < yL(x) < yL(x
′) < 1, and so cost(xt, yL(x
′)) < cost(xt, yL(x)),
which contradicts the truthfulness of M. Thus Case 3 never occurs.
By the cases above, there exists at least one input on which the approximation ratio of M is
Ω
(
n
log(n)
)
, which completes the proof.
Theorem 5 (restated): For every n ∈ N there is a truthful deterministic decision tree of size
O(n6) that approximates the social cost within a factor of O
(
n
log(n)
)
.
Proof. First, we claim that for every k ∈ {1, . . . , n/2}, there exists a truthful, deterministic decision
tree of size O(26k) that approximates the social cost within a factor of O
(
n−k
k
)
. Given a fixed k,
let M be the following mechanism:
• Given input x = (x1, . . . , xn), output median({x1, . . . , xk}).
That is,M always outputs the median of the fixed set of agents {1, . . . , k}. Computing the median
on an input vector of size k requires fewer than 6k comparisons [4], and since the decision tree for
M is binary, its size is O(26k).
We next claim that the approximation ratio ofM is O
(
n−k
k
)
. Indeed, given any instance x ∈ Rn,
denote m˜ = M(x) and m∗ = argminy∈Rsc(x, y). Without loss of generality, assume that m˜ < m
∗
16
and let ∆ = |m˜−m∗|. Let Sl = {xi | xi ≤ m˜}, Sr = {xi | xi ≥ m
∗}, and Sm = {xi | m˜ < xi < m
∗}
be the sets of points to the left of m˜, to the right ofm∗, and strictly between m˜ andm∗, respectively.
Denote the sizes of the sets by nl = |Sl|, nr = |Sr|, and nm = |Sm|, where nl + nm + nr = n.
We compute the upper bound by comparing the social cost ofM on x, sc(x,M(x)) =
∑n
i=1 cost(xi, m˜),
with sc∗(x) =
∑n
i=1 cost(xi,m
∗). Observe that for all the points in Sr, the cost increases by exactly
∆ when moving the location from m∗ to m˜. On the other hand, the change from m∗ to m˜ results
in a decrease by exactly ∆ for the points in Sl. Thus sc(x,M(x)) can be expressed as follows:
sc(x,M(x)) = sc∗(x) + nr ·∆+
∑
j∈Sm
[cost(xj , m˜)− cost(xj ,m
∗)]− nl ·∆.
The ratio of the costs is:
sc(x,M(x))
sc∗(x)
=
sc∗(x) + nr ·∆+
∑
j∈Sm
[cost(xj , m˜)− cost(xj,m
∗)]− nl ·∆
sc∗(x)
.
We claim that
sc(x,M(x))
sc∗(x)
≤
3(n− k)
k
. (1)
Inequality (1) is equivalent to:
k · nr ·∆+ k ·
∑
j∈Sm
[cost(xj , m˜)− cost(xj,m
∗)]− k · nl ·∆ ≤ (3n− 4k)sc
∗(x).
Note that for all j ∈ Sm, cost(xj , m˜) − cost(xj ,m
∗) ≤ ∆, and so if Inequality (1) holds when
cost(xj , m˜) − cost(xj ,m
∗) = ∆, then it also holds for all other instances where the change in cost
is smaller for some agents j ∈ Sm. Formally, if:
k · nr ·∆+ k · nm ·∆− k · nl ·∆ ≤ (3n− 4k)sc
∗(x), (2)
then Inequality (1) also holds. Inequality (2) is equivalent to:
sc∗(x) ≥
k · nr ·∆+ k · nm ·∆− k · nl ·∆
3n− 4k
=
k · (nr + (n− nl − nr)− nl) ·∆
3n− 4k
=
k · (n− 2nl) ·∆
3n− 4k
.
(3)
Each of the agents in Sl pays a cost of at least ∆ under sc
∗(x), and so sc∗(x) ≥ nl ·∆. Moreover,
since m˜ is the median of {x1, . . . , xk}, it follows that nl ≥
k
2 . We first show that nl ·∆ ≥
k·(n−2nl)·∆
3n−4k :
nl ·∆ ≥
k · (n− 2nl) ·∆
3n− 4k
⇐⇒ nl(3n − 4k) ≥ k(n− 2nl)
⇐⇒ nl(3n − 2k) ≥ kn
⇐⇒ nl ≥
kn
3n − 2k
(4)
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In addition, we have that
k
2
≥
kn
3n − 2k
⇐⇒ 3kn− 2k2 ≥ 2kn ⇐⇒ n ≥ 2k. (5)
Inequality (5) holds by the choice of k; combining it with nl ≥
k
2 , we obtain:
nl ≥
k
2
≥
kn
3n− 2k
. (6)
By Inequality (3), it follows that nl ·∆ ≥
k·(n−2nl)·∆
3n−4k . In addition, sc
∗(x) ≥ nl ·∆, thus:
sc∗(x) ≥ nl ·∆ ≥
k · (n − 2nl) ·∆
3n− 4k
.
Equivalently, Inequality (2) holds, which gives the worst case bound required for Inequality (1) to
always hold. Thus sc(x,M(x))sc∗(x) ≤
3(n−k)
k , for every input x.
Let k = log n. Then M can be implemented using a decision tree of size O(n6) and has an
approximation ratio bounded by
sc(x,M(x))
sc∗(x)
≤
3(n − k)
k
∈ O
(
n
log(n)
)
This completes the proof of the theorem.
B.2 Missing Proofs: Randomized Mechanisms
Theorem 6 (restated): For every 0 < ǫ < 110 and n ∈ N, there exists a universally truthful
randomized decision tree of polynomial size in n that approximates the social cost to a factor of 1+ǫ.
The idea is the following: we sample a subset of agents of logarithmic size – more exactly O
(
ln(n/ǫ)
ǫ2
)
– and select the median among their reported locations. To reason about this mechanism, we define
the rank of an element x in a set S ordered by ≻ to be rank(x) = |{y ∈ S | y ≻ x∨y = x}|, and the
ǫ-median of S to be x ∈ S such that (1/2 − ǫ)|S| < rank(x) < (1/2 + ǫ)|S|. The following lemma
is a folklore result when sampling is done with replacement; we include its proof because we must
sample without replacement.
Lemma 1. Consider the algorithm that samples t elements without replacement from a set S of
cardinality n, and returns the median of the sampled points. For any ǫ, δ < 1/10, if
100 ln 1δ
ǫ2
≤ t ≤ ǫn,
then the algorithm returns an ǫ-median with probability 1− δ.
Proof. We partition S into three subsets:
S1 = {x ∈ S | rank(x) ≤ n/2− ǫn},
S2 = {x ∈ S | n/2− ǫn < rank(x) < n/2 + ǫn},
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and
S3 = {x ∈ S | rank(x) ≥ n/2− ǫn}.
Suppose that t elements are sampled without replacement from S. If less than t/2 are sampled
from S1, and less than t/2 are sampled from S3, then the median of the sampled elements will
belong to S2 — implying that it is an ǫ-approximate median.
Let us, therefore, focus on the probability of sampling at least t/2 samples from S1. Define a
Bernoulli random variable Xi for all i = 1, . . . , t, which takes the value 1 if and only if the i’th
sample is in S1.
Note that X1, . . . ,Xt are not independent (because we are sampling with replacement), but for
all i it holds that
Pr[Xi = 1 | X1 = x1, . . . ,Xi−1 = xi−1] ≤
n
2 − ǫn
n− (i− 1)
≤
n
2 − ǫn
n− ǫn
≤
1
2
−
ǫ
3
,
for any (x1, . . . , xi−1) ∈ {0, 1}
i−1, where the second inequality follows from i ≤ t ≤ ǫn.
Let Y1, . . . , Yt be i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables such that Yi = 1 with probability 1/2− ǫ/3.
Then for all x,
Pr
[
t∑
i=1
Xi ≥ x
]
≤ Pr
[
t∑
i=1
Yi ≥ x
]
.
Using Chernoff’s inequality, we conclude that
Pr
[
t∑
i=1
Xi ≥
t
2
]
≤ Pr
[
t∑
i=1
Yi ≥
t
2
]
= Pr
[
t∑
i=1
Yi ≥
(
1 +
ǫ
3
2 − ǫ
)
E
[
t∑
i=1
Yi
]]
≤ Pr
[
t∑
i=1
Yi ≥
(
1 +
ǫ
2
)
E
[
t∑
i=1
Yi
]]
≤ exp
(
−
(
ǫ
2
)2 (1
2 −
ǫ
3
)
t
3
)
≤
δ
2
,
where the last inequality follows from the assumption that t ≥ 100 ln(1/δ)
ǫ2
. The lemma’s proof is
completed by applying symmetric arguments to S3, and using the union bound.
Proof of Theorem 6. Let x = 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 be the set of inputs. For every k ∈ N , define the
mechanism Mn,k as follows:
• Select uniformly at random a subset Sk ⊆ N , where |Sk| = k.
• Output the median of Sk.
Note that Mn,1 coincides with random dictator, while Mn,n is the median mechanism. Recall
that random dictator, Mn,1, has an approximation ratio of 2 − 2/n for the social cost, while the
median, Mn,n, is optimal. The approximation ratio of Mn,k improves as k grows from 1 to n and
the mechanism is universally truthful for every k; in particular, we show there exists a choice of k
that achieves a good tradeoff between the size of the mechanism and its approximation ratio.
First, we describe the implementation of Mn,k as a randomized decision tree. The root has
outgoing degree one and selects a function F that takes k arguments Z = {z1, . . . , zk} and com-
putes the median of z1, . . . , zk. At execution time, z1, . . . , zk are instantiated using the locations
xi1 , . . . , xik of k distinct agents, chosen uniformly at random from k-subsets of N . Note that F can
be implemented with a decision tree of size O(26k).
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Let ǫ′, δ > 0 be fixed such that ǫ′, δ < 110 . By Lemma 1, the algorithm that samples without
replacement t = ⌈
100 ln 1
δ
(ǫ′)2
⌉ elements from a set of n elements returns an ǫ′-median with probability
1− δ, as long as t ≤ ǫ′n.
Let x ∈ Rn; without loss of generality x1 ≤ · · · ≤ xn. We wish to compare E[sc(x,Mn,t(x))]
and sc∗(x). Let us suppose that Mn,t returns an ǫ
′-median, call it xl. Since xl is an ǫ
′-median, we
have that n2 − ǫ
′n < l < n2 + ǫ
′n. Take the case where l < n2 (the other case, where l >
n
2 , is similar)
and let ∆ = |xl − xm|, where xm = median(x). Then by moving the facility from xm to xl, the
costs of the agents change as follows:
(i) Each agent to the left of xl (including agent l) has the cost decreased by exactly ∆.
(ii) Each agent strictly between xl and xm incurs an increase in cost of at most ∆.
(iii) Each agent to the right of xm (including agent m) has the cost increased by ∆.
It follows that
sc(x, xl) ≤ sc
∗(x) − l ·∆+ (n− l) ·∆ = sc∗(x) + (n− 2l) ·∆.
On those instances whereMn,t does not return the median, the social cost is at most (n−1)·diam(x),
where diam(x) = maxi,j∈N |xi − xj|. On the other hand, the optimal cost satisfies the inequalities:
sc∗(x) ≥ diam(x) and sc∗(x) ≥ l ·∆.
Since Mn,t returns an ǫ
′-median with probability 1 − δ, the ratio of the costs can be bounded
by:
scMn,t(x)
sc∗(x)
≤
(1− δ)sc∗(x) + ∆(1− δ)(n − 2l) + δ(n − 1) · diam(x)
sc∗(x)
≤ (1− δ) +
∆(1− δ)(n − 2l)
∆ · l
+
δ(n − 1) · diam(x)
diam(x)
= 1− δ + (1− δ)
n
l
− 2(1− δ) + δ(n − 1)
≤ δ · n− 1 + (1− δ)
2
1 − 2ǫ′
≤ 1 + δ · n+ 5ǫ′.
Given ǫ < 1/10, let ǫ′ = ǫ/10 and δ = ǫ/(2n), and set t = ⌈
100 ln 1
δ
(ǫ′)2
⌉. Then Mn,t can be
represented as a randomized decision tree of size O(26t), which is polynomial in n. Moreover, for
this choice of ǫ′, δ, the approximation ratio of Mn,t is bounded by
1 + δ · n+ 5ǫ′ = 1 =
ǫ
2
+
ǫ
2
= 1 + ǫ.
Theorem 7 (restated): For each ǫ > 0, there exists no universally truthful mechanism given as
a distribution over countably many deterministic mechanisms that can approximate the maximum
cost on the line within a factor of 2− ǫ.
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Proof. We use the following characterization due to Moulin [22]. Let a voting scheme be defined
as a mapping π : Rn → R, such that for every tuple of inputs x = 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 ∈ R
n, the selected
alternative is π(x) ∈ R.
Lemma 2 (Moulin 1980). The voting scheme π among n agents is strategy-proof if and only if
there exists for every subset S ⊆ {1, . . . , n} (including the empty set) a real number aS ∈ R∪{±∞}
such that:
• For each x ∈ Rn, π(x) = infS⊆{1,...,n}
[
supi∈S{xi, aS}
]
.
Note that by definition, the output of the mechanism is always finite. This simply restricts the
values of aS such that it cannot be the case that either (i) a∅ = −∞, or (ii) aS = +∞ for all
S ⊆ N .
To get some intuition first, we show an example of the median mechanism in the format required
by Lemma 2. Let N = {1, 2, 3} and define a∅ = a1 = a2 = a3 = +∞ and a12 = a23 = a31 = a123 =
−∞, where aij is the constant corresponding to subset S = {i, j}. Then for any x ∈ R
3, we have:
π(x) = inf
{
sup{a∅},
sup{x1, a1}, sup{x2, a2}, sup{x3, a3},
sup{x1, x2, a12}, sup{x2, x3, a23}, sup{x3, x1, a13},
sup{x1, x2, x3, a123}
}
For example, if x1 = 1, x2 = 3, and x3 = 2, the location of the facility is:
π(〈1, 3, 2〉) = inf
{
sup{+∞},
sup{1,+∞}, sup{3,+∞}, sup{2,+∞},
sup{1, 3,−∞}, sup{3, 2,−∞}, sup{2, 1,−∞},
sup{1, 3, 2,−∞}
}
= 2,
which represents the median of the input vector.
We can now analyze the approximation ratios of universally truthful mechanisms with respect to
the maximum cost objective. Let ǫ > 0. Take any universally truthful mechanism M, represented
as a probability distribution over deterministic truthful mechanisms chosen from a universe U =
{Mk | k ∈ K}, where K ⊆ N. Denote by pk the probability that mechanism Mk is selected
during the execution of M (for any input x ∈ Rn). Note that pk > 0, since otherwise Mk can be
eliminated from the description of M, and
∑
k∈K pk = 1.
For each t ∈ N, define the following:
• St = {k | k ∈ K and pk ≥
1
2t } — the set of indices of mechanisms Mk taken with probability
at least 1/2t, and
• qt =
∑
k∈St
pk — the probability that some mechanism Mk with k ∈ St is selected.
21
Note that ∅ ⊆ S0 ⊆ S1 ⊆ . . . ⊆ ST ⊆ . . . ⊆ U and 0 ≤ q0 ≤ q1 ≤ . . . ≤ qT ≤ . . . ≤ 1. We have that
limt→∞ qt = 1, and so there exists T ∈ N such that qT > 1 − ǫ/2. Clearly ST is a finite set and
each (deterministic) mechanism Mk with k ∈ ST has the property that pk ≥ 1/2
T .
By Lemma 2, for each k ∈ ST , there exist constants a
k
S ∈ R ∪ {±∞} for each subset S ⊆
{1, . . . , n}, such that Mk(x) = infS⊆{1,...,n}
[
supi∈S{xi, a
k
S}
]
, for all x ∈ Rn.
Define P =
⋃
k∈ST
⋃
S⊆{1,...,n}{a
k
S | − ∞ < a
k
S < +∞} as the set of all finite constant points
hardcoded in the mechanisms indexed by ST . Since P is finite, there exists a contiguous interval
[a, a+ 1] on the line such that P ∩ [a, a+ 1] = ∅ and the points a, a+ 1 are far from the set P , i.e.
for all y ∈ P , we have that d(y, a) > 2T and d(y, a + 1) > 2T .
Let x be defined as follows: x1 = . . . = xn−1 = a and xn = a+ 1. The optimal maximum cost
on input x is 1/2 and can be obtained by placing the facility at y∗ = a + 1/2. We analyze the
behavior of M on input x and consider two cases:
1. If there exists k ∈ ST such thatMk(x) ∈ P , then by definition of P and x, the approximation
ratio of M can be bounded as follows:
E
[
mc(x,M(x))
]
mc∗(x)
=
E
[
maxi∈N cost(xi,M(x))
]
mc∗(x)
= 2 ·
∑
k∈U
(
pk ·max
i∈N
cost(xi,Mk(x))
)
≥ 2
(
1
2T
)
2T = 2
2. Otherwise, Mk(x) 6∈ P for all k ∈ ST . Then by Lemma 2, for each mechanism Mk with
k ∈ ST , there exists ik ∈ N such that Mk(x) = xik . Since xi ∈ {a, a + 1} for all i ∈ N , the
maximum cost incurred when mechanism Mk gets selected is d(a, a+1) = 1. Then by choice
of ST , the approximation ratio of M can be bounded by:
E
[
mc(x,M(x))
]
mc∗(x)
=
E
[
maxi∈N cost(xi,M(x))
]
mc∗(x)
= 2 ·
∑
k∈U
(
pk ·max
i∈N
cost(xi,Mk(x))
)
≥ 2 ·
∑
k∈ST
(
pk · 1
)
= 2 · qT
> 2(1− ǫ/2) = 2− ǫ
From Cases 1 and 2 we obtain that the approximation ratio of M on input x is worse than
2− ǫ, which completes the proof of the theorem.
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